Moving EU Civilian Crisis Management Forward: More Capable, More Flexible, More Responsive

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Moving EU Civilian Crisis Management Forward

More Capable, More Flexible, More Responsive

by Carina Böttcher and Marie Wolf (eds.)

Federal Foreign Office

Government Offices of Sweden
Ministry for Foreign Affairs

DGAP

Conference: Moving EU Civilian Crisis Management Forward

This report is based on the findings of the Conference “Moving EU Civilian Crisis Management Forward”. The conference took place from 24-26 October 2018 at Schwielowsee.

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Dr Christian Mölling (DGAP) opening the conference

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The Future of EU Civilian Crisis Management

The security environment of the European Union (EU) has changed dramatically over the past decade. New complex conflicts have erupted in the EU's neighborhood, including Ukraine, Syria, Libya and Yemen, while long-standing conflicts such as Iraq and Afghanistan persist. Moreover, the rule-based world order has been increasingly fragmenting over the last years, and is facing a rise of interest-based foreign policy resting on power and deterrence. The EU has recognized that today's problems arising from conflicts and instability cannot be solved by individual member states. Instead, EU member states have taken measures to react to old and new security challenges with one voice – for example, by taking a common position on the Iran nuclear deal and prioritizing political engagement in the conflict in Ukraine.

Member states share the understanding that they must strengthen EU policies and instruments to rise to the many challenges. Military means can freeze conflicts and thereby provide space for negotiations, but they cannot create sustainable security. Therefore, in the present security environment, civilian crisis management is more needed than ever before. After member states strengthened the EU military cooperation in 2017, civilian crisis management ranked high on the political agenda in 2018.

Currently, the EU maintains ten civilian crisis management missions in its Eastern neighborhood, the Middle East, the Sahel and at the Horn of Africa with about 2,000 staff. Experts are carrying out wide-ranging tasks such as strategic advice, monitoring, capacity-building and policing. In the field, missions cooperate and coordinate with six EU military CSDP missions, Commission programs, member state embassies, an Article 28 Action, and many more EU instruments and programs. Furthermore, they also interact with other national and international actors such as civil society, host governments, the UN or the African Union. To strengthen this EU-integrated approach to conflicts and crises, all instruments must be fit for purpose – including civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and other civilian instruments.

In November 2017, EU member states began a political process to strengthen civilian CSDP for new security challenges and to renew political and resource commitments.[1] The first step to this end was to launch a new concept for civilian CSDP. In the second step, the European External Action Service (EEAS) drafted a Civilian Capability Development Plan, analyzing capability gaps and needs in current civilian missions and pointing out suggestions for further capability development in member states. The process culminated in the adoption of a Civilian Compact in November 2018 – which could be the start of an important push for the whole of EU civilian crisis management.

From 24-26 October 2018, the Federal Foreign Office of Germany, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) hosted the conference "Moving Civilian Crisis Management Forward" at Schwielowsee near Potsdam, Germany. It brought together all relevant stakeholders to discuss pressing issues and challenges ahead of EU civilian crisis management, and in particular, civilian CSDP.

The conference results will provide relevant inputs for the EU member states who sealed the ambitious Compact. This initiative marks the beginning of a crucial process to make civilian crisis management fit for future challenges. Following the start of its implementation in 2019, significant work remains for the next years. DGAP and its project team on civilian CSDP will remain committed to support the further process through research and expert gatherings. We are looking forward to the next steps toward a further professionalization of civilian CSDP.

Dr. Christian Mölling, Research Director, DGAP

1. Moving EU Civilian Crisis Management Forward

1.1 Executive Summary

As part of its efforts to strengthen its CSDP, the EU and its member states are attempting to enhance the civilian means of crisis management. In November 2018, they adopted a Civilian CSDP Compact to equally strengthen the civilian CSDP. The Compact will serve as a refence document for the whole-of-EU civilian crisis management in the next years. It marks the start of an implementation process in which member states can take decisive steps toward improved capabilities, structures and operational conduct.

Background: A new EU Global Strategy

The EU is currently undertaking efforts to realign and improve its CSDP. In today's complex security environment, new security challenges cannot be tackled by individual member states, but demand a common response: Irregular migration, terrorism and hybrid threats can only be sustainably addressed in the EU framework.
In 2016, the EU Global Strategy has put forward a renewed analysis of the current strategic environment of the EU and new priorities for all of its external action. To implement them, the EU will need both strong military and civilian means of crisis management. Consequently, the EU member states began to improve the CSDP to prepare it for future challenges. In 2017, they have strengthened the military realm through the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the European Defence Fund (EDF).

In strengthening the **EU as a civilian crisis management actor**, different challenges arise: Firstly, changes in the security environment demand **a more responsive and flexible civilian crisis management**. Therefore, the member states need to take measures to strengthen the EU as a civilian crisis management actor and make the missions fit for purpose. Secondly, in light of new security challenges such as hybrid threats, terrorism or cyber security, it is important to define for which priorities civilian CSDP is deployed. The old **Feira priorities have to be revisited** to make civilian CSDP fit for new security challenges. Thirdly, **the implementation of the internal-external nexus** will be a key task for the coming years. Civilian CSDP missions need to cooperate and coordinate with EU agencies such as Frontex and Europol as well as other internal security actors. A functioning cooperation is crucial for the security in and around the EU. Fourthly, EU member states need to find common ground on the EU's role as a security actor and the idea of a **European Security and Defence Union**. So far, member states have recognized the need for more cooperation to articulate EU interests on the international stage and to act as a capable actor and partner.

The conference participants came from 21 different EU countries

Overall, **civilian CSDP needs to be communicated strategically** to crucial target audiences such as national politicians, line ministries and the broader public to underline its relevance, purpose and successes. A better communication from EU institutions and Foreign Ministries could foster the understanding for the instrument and greater support for the needs of civilian CSDP at national level.

For short-term progress, the **Civilian CSDP Compact 2018** can serve as a reference document for ambitions and direction in 2019 and beyond. Crucial aspects are **verifiable commitments, a regular review mechanism, as well as greater flexibility in the mandates**. Member states need to strengthen and expand national structures as well as the secondment of personnel. To refocus and professionalize civilian CSDP, it needs to become an inherent part of national capability development. Through a review process, member states can exchange knowledge on capability development and track progress on commitments. To make civilian CSDP more flexible, capable and responsive, it will be necessary to adapt the mission's mandates. Mandates must be tailored to meet the needs arising from the individual conflict environments, the development of external factors during the mission, and new security challenges in general.

2. Key Challenges in Future Civilian Crisis Management

2.1. Dealing with the Nexus of Internal and External Security

2.1.1. Background: Dealing with the Nexus of Internal and External Security – The CSDP-FSJ Response

By Roderick Parkes

Status Quo: Overlap between CSDP Missions and Home Affairs Agencies

There is incipient competition between CSDP missions and home affairs agencies (also known as "FSJ agencies", given their role in protecting the EU's Area of Freedom Security and Justice). This competition arises because civilian CSDP missions and FSJ agencies increasingly overlap in tasks and geographic coverage. The competition is particularly intense between civilian CSDP missions and the borders agency Frontex.

The 2015-2016 migration crisis serves as an illustrative example. The crisis had two distinct root causes, namely instability outside, and poor border standards inside the EU. CSDP missions are designed precisely to address instability abroad, and FSJ agencies to improve standards in the EU. However, some kind of a role reversal appears to have taken place: CSDP missions stretched ever closer to Europe until they were protecting the very border of Schengen, and Frontex experts were pushed ever further abroad into conflict zones.

Both formats are now operating in ways and places for which they were not designed. The EU's current strategic reflections do not necessarily clarify matters. When the European Commission drafted its March 2018 Integrated Border Management Strategy for Frontex, it failed even to mention the Civilian CSDP Compact process. Realities on the ground reflect this lack of acknowledgement: FSJ agencies seem more eager to coordinate with military than civilian CSDP missions, since military missions offer potential access to military-grade intelligence.

Frontex is currently pursuing a series of status agreements with third countries to rapidly deploy its own executive missions, as well as tapping into EU development funds to sustain its work abroad. In stark contrast, civilian CSDP missions have long struggled to generate assets and political will for quick overseas deployments. They are pushing ever closer to the EU because it is expedient to appeal to EU governments' internal security interests. They are proposing locations along the EU border where they could best "protect Europe".

Frontex looks set to come out on top in any competition with civilian CSDP missions. Frontex is currently being turned into a European border force with as many as 10,000 personnel. This will drain the pool of potential staff from civilian CSDP missions. Additionally, Frontex is likely to become even more enthusiastic about deploying staff abroad for the simple reason that member states resist its executive deployments on their own territory. If these trends continue, well-funded FSJ agencies could largely replace civilian CSDP missions abroad. Even military CSDP missions would be reduced to a supportive function, protecting FSJ agencies abroad.

The Compact: Time to Consider Joint FSJ-CSDP Formats

As the EU has finite personnel and assets, it needs to consider more carefully how and where to place them. The Union could prepare plans for a series of joint FSJ-CSDP formats to deploy when the need arises. Currently, four generic options for joint FSJ-CSDP formats are conceivable:

1. Geographic division of labor: In this constellation, CSDP missions focus on the EU's crime and migration problems at source abroad, home affairs agencies address the effects inside the EU, and joint FSJ-CSDP actions tackle the transit route. Alternatively, CSDP missions focus on scattered hotspots abroad, while FSJ agencies embed these in a regional dimension. For instance, the EU could deploy a CSDP border mission to Agadez, Niger, while FSJ agencies work with EU development funds to cover the entire Sahel region.
2. Sequential operations: CSDP missions retain their unique role in stabilizing the immediate drivers of crime and migration abroad, but hand over to FSJ agencies once circumstances relax. Thus, CSDP missions swiftly deploy, and address and contain the basic drivers of cross-border irregular migration, crime or insecurity. Frontex – or alternatively the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), Eurojust, or Europol – then takes over for the EU's long-term engagement and Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the affected country.
3. "Plug-in" missions: Individual CSDP missions are deployed on a long-term basis. As they settle into their host country, and adapt their mandates to changing de-

mands on the ground, they plug in to expertise stored in Frontex, Europol, or the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). To this end, CSDP missions could either house FSJ personnel in situ, or liaise with Centres of Excellence maintained by FSJ agencies in their headquarters or in individual member states.

4. Fully integrated EU missions: FSJ and CSDP personnel would work together in a third country at a joint diplomatic base, potentially the European Commission Delegation (EUDEL). Together, they have the potential to unlock a full range of EU international tools, including military cooperation, humanitarian aid, and basic development cooperation. This integrated CSDP-FSJ mission would in turn connect the EU to the local efforts of the UN or NATO.

Future Challenges: Finding New Partners

The above debate about new EU security formats is a rather inward-looking one. It involves linking up the EU's modest internal and external security arms, and it entails responding to international problems as and when these impinge on Europe. In reality, a growing range of third countries are becoming terrorist targets and migration destinations, and they are potential new partners for the EU and its modest resources.

Even third countries which are normally protective of their sovereignty are increasingly inclined to cooperate in the face of new border, crime and terrorism threats. The head of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is Russian, so too is the OSCE's Head of the Action against Terrorism Unit. The recently resigned President of Interpol is Chinese, and non-Western multilateral platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union are promoting their own customs and anti-trafficking rules.

When the 2015-2016 migration crisis abated in Europe, it was in part because migrants were increasingly attracted to labor destinations far from the EU – to South Africa, Nigeria, and the Gulf. Indeed, even traditional emigrant countries in Africa and Asia are now themselves receiving immigrants, and are advocating for borders and readmissions cooperation in the UN. Meanwhile, the EU itself has become a source of international security threats, as shown by the phenomenon of Foreign Terrorist Fighters.

As the power and lure of third countries are growing, the EU's ability to leverage this is actually shrinking. Brexit encapsulates some of the challenges facing the EU when it comes to finding and influencing new partners. The UK has made the EU more attractive and influential, and it retains ties to countries such as South Africa, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia. Yet, the debate inside the EU about the UK leaving is inward-looking – it is about the impact on CSDP and FSJ agencies, and which of the two might emerge stronger following the UK's exit.

In finding new partners, the EU will need to rethink where, why and especially how it deploys CSDP and FSJ. For instance, Europe instinctively tends to think that speedy deployment is good, but Russia criticizes the EU's undue haste to get boots on the ground without first seeking partners. The same applies to the EU's instinct to break down internal and external silos as well as civil-military distinctions. The EU may view it as necessary to break down these distinctions, particularly when dealing with a blurred security nexus. One should, however, remember that this also bears the risk of confusing potential partners.

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2.1.2. Current Challenges and Discussions

Key Take-Aways:

- **In order to foster cooperation, actors need to address the existing competition between CSDP missions and Frontex due to overlaps both in geography and tasks.**
- **While fully integrated EU missions are a distant prospect, several possibilities for a functioning division of labor are under discussion.**
- **Well-designed plug-in missions present a promising option for cooperation of CSDP missions with Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) agencies.**
- **Relevant authorities must better communicate the successes and added value of civilian CSDP. To this end, it is vital for civilian CSDP to overcome operational difficulties to prove its added value compared to Frontex, which politicians might tend to support for the lure of short-term political capital.**

The EU **currently faces multifold challenges** in its external relations, including increasing migration, instability and insecurity, and crime. CSDP and Frontex were designed as instruments to respond to these issues. Due to the extension of competences and geographic scope of Frontex, tension or competition – rather than cooperation – have come to characterize the current relationship between CSDP missions and Frontex operations. While this has not been an issue in past civilian CSDP missions (e.g. in Bosnia), it is an increasingly acute problem in face of current plans to massively augment Frontex resources, both in personnel and budget. Therefore, this problem requires urgent attention.

Several promising possibilities for a **division of labor** are under discussion. Among the four options currently debated at expert level, fully integrated EU missions would be an ideal solution for the mid- or long-term future. However, since they do not appear to be feasible in the next years, well-designed plug-in missions could serve as a viable alternative. In this scenario, missions would present the overarching frameworks in crisis areas to which others actors such as Frontex could plug in temporarily. A third option would be a geographic division of labor, in which e.g. Frontex would operate in the EU's Eastern neighborhood and CSDP would be responsible for the South (i.e. Africa) – a scenario which experts associated with Frontex often prefer. Another possibility consists of sequential operations, in which CSDP deploys rapidly for short-term crisis management and hands over to Frontex once an operating area is stabilized.

There is currently a range of **operational challenges** linked to the nexus of internal and external security. In light of the plans to massively upscale Frontex's staff – by up to 10,000 – and budget, it is all but inevitable that competition for resources and qualified staff will rise even further. This competition risks undermining the efforts for stronger coordination and cooperation in the field in an integrated approach. Sourcing enough candidates who are interested and qualified for both Frontex and CSDP missions at the same time is another related problem. The fact that training them adequately is time-consuming further adds to this issue.

Key challenges for the future will be to demonstrate to a wider public the added value of civilian CSDP against Frontex, and to **better communicate** the former's relevance and successes. Experts tend to regard the massive

Working group on the internal-external security nexus

Teemu Tammikko (FIIA) contributing to the discussion

staff increase of Frontex as a rather short-term and easy-to-implement political goal. This increase will require funds in the next Multiannual Financial Framework to appease the European public. Despite some ongoing efforts to better communicate civilian CSDP – such as the current ZIF initiative to offer experts returning from their missions a platform to inform the public about their experiences –, there are further opportunities for enhancement when it comes to conveying crucial messages and information both to the media and the public.

The **role of information exchange** has, thus far, not played a prominent role in developing civilian CSDP, but promises important potential for future cooperation on the internal-external nexus. A key topic for the future is the so far neglected issue of information and intelligence exchange. There is much room for improvement in CSDP and among JHA agencies and CSDP missions and operations in this field. The current pilot of a Crime Information Cell in Operation Sophia, where Europol is sharing operational intelligence about human trafficking in the Mediterranean with the mission, has been an important leap toward making better use of this potential. If civilian experts and Frontex officers from different member states were to connect more regularly in common missions, this would mark another step toward achieving more complementarity.

Other relevant discussion points on the internal-external security nexus for **the future are the viability of sharing border guards among member states, and the question whether instruments or executive and non-executive tasks in CSDP** should be mixed or not. These issues need to be discussed in the context of an increasing politicization of security: The priority is increasingly set on protecting Europe rather than addressing the roots and structures of conflict. To strengthen CSDP, member states should take into account its comparative advantages. To protect EU borders might not be one of them.

2.2. The Civilian CSDP Compact as a Building Block of a Common European Security and Defence Union?

2.2.1. Background: The Civilian CSDP Compact as a Building Block of a Common European Security and Defence Union?

By Carina Böttcher

There are plenty of reasons to advance further integration in security and defense in the EU. The most important ones are as follows: First, the security environment of the Union has changed. In light of complex conflicts and new security challenges in the EU's direct neighborhood, all member states recognize the need to take on more responsibility for their security. Second, fragmenting multilateralism increases the risk of paralysis of other international crisis management actors such as the UN. Third, the EU can no longer rely on its traditional partner in security and defense, the United States, to the previous extent.

Against this backdrop, the idea of a European Security and Defence Union (ESDU) has recently regained momentum despite the lack of a specific end date. There is a rising demand for more strategic autonomy for the EU in security and defense. But debates as well as the latest advancements towards this goal have almost exclusively focused on military aspects. In 2017, the EU military cooperation has experienced a push through the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the European Defence Fund (EDF). Yet despite these advances, an ESDU or strategic autonomy for the EU cannot be realized without a strong civilian crisis management component.

Member states sought to strengthen the civilian CSDP through a Compact by the end of 2018. It will also shape the EU's ambition for the entirety of civilian crisis management in the years to come. As of yet, it is unclear if this Compact will ultimately produce anything beyond broad political pledges, with negotiations illustrating how far member states diverge on priorities and vision for civilian CSDP. Thus, it is not sufficient to discuss capabilities and operational details for civilian CSDP. Member states are facing a markedly more difficult task: to shape a greater strategic vision for EU civilian crisis management for 2019 and beyond, and to convert the Compact into a step towards an ESDU.

Pushing Towards Greater Strategic Coherence in Civilian Crisis Management

Without a strong civilian crisis management to balance the EU's military engagement, the effects of military crisis management will fall short. While military interventions can freeze conflicts and thereby open a space for negotiations, it is only then that the actual work begins. Civilian crisis management is crucial for addressing the roots of conflicts that impact the EU's security. In the range of civilian instruments, civilian CSDP can demonstrate quick presence and support local partners with stabilization measures. Highly visible, it is the flagship of the EU's crisis management capabilities, and can initiate a cycle of support for partner countries to implement the EU integrated approach to create sustainable security. However, this can only function if the latter works effectively and if institutional quarrels about resources and competences cease.

The EU lacks a shared strategic vision for civilian crisis management. Thirteen of the member states do not acknowledge the strategic relevance of civilian crisis management in their national security strategies, instead focusing exclusively on military crisis management.[2] Those who do mention its significance differ widely in their assessment thereof, from civilian crisis management as a pure support element to military action to attributing it a role in protecting core security interests in a changing world. Member states also lack a common understanding of which problems they wish to solve by civilian means in general and civilian CSDP in particular.

The EU needs more integration in security and defense. Civilian crisis management must be an integral part of this effort and should not lag behind military advancements. Therefore, it is of essential importance that the member states initiate a strategy process on civilian crisis management. While at a strategic level, the EU Global Strategy of 2016 was a promising move for promoting broader goals for the whole of EU external action, at member state level, it did not lead to commonly shared perceptions and preferences on security and defense – including civilian crisis management. Member states still differ on whether civilian crisis management is necessary and if so, to what extent.

A strategy process dedicated specifically to civilian crisis management could clarify issues that currently hamper the full implementation of the EU integrated approach. The overarching question of this process should be: Do EU member states, through serious engagement in civilian crisis management, want to further promote a sustainable crisis management approach that responds to the needs of partner countries and encourages demo-

cratization, inclusion of civil society and human rights? Member states also need to reflect upon which kinds of problems they wish to solve by civilian means, and define a clear division of labor between the civilian instruments while considering their individual strengths and weaknesses. Complementarity – rather than the redefinition of all instruments – should be the motto to enable a focus on common, immediate domestic priorities, as is the case in migration management.

The Compact as an Intermediate Step Towards More Integration in Security and Defense

In late 2018, member states had the opportunity to decide on the role which civilian crisis management could assume in the next years. The Compact stirs momentum and opens up a unique window of opportunity. Thus, it must be used as an intermediate step towards a joined-up ESDU, even if this may appear distant for the moment. If the EU is serious in its ambitions to be a capable and credible actor in international security, civilian crisis management should not be regarded as a mere supplement. It is essential that member states overcome the pure technical and operational debates by clearly framing the Compact as a strategic long-term plan to strengthen the EU as a relevant actor in international security.

The EU Global Strategy stated: "In a more complex world, we must stand united. Only the combined weight of a true union has the potential to deliver security, prosperity and democracy to its citizens and make a positive difference in the world."[3] The EU needs a strong civilian crisis management as part of its answer to conflicts and crises in the future. In 2019, member states can start to shape a true common vision for this by committing to an ambitious and strategically aligned Compact for civilian CSDP – and they should. In the Compact, this should be reflected through the following commitments:

- Member states should contribute to a strategic vision for EU security and defense through the Compact. They need to acknowledge that civilian crisis management is an integral part of a future ESDU.
- Military and civilian efforts should be balanced. Member states should not imitate advancements on the military CSDP, but reflect upon necessary measures to create valuable complementarity.
- Member states should commit to the goal of an EU civilian crisis management strategy to be drafted in 2019, which defines clear goals for civilian crisis management and establishes a clear and functional division of labor between the different actors in EU civilian crisis management.
- The Compact should contain a detailed timeline for implementation and the assessment of outputs.

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2.2.2. Current Challenges and Discussions

Key Take-Aways:

- **Member states acknowledge the necessity for stronger cooperation on security and defense in the EU.**
- **The strategic framework already exists, but needs to become member state-owned and avoid overburdening in order to generate strong operational commitments.**
- **Member states attach different levels of relevance to civilian CSDP.**
- **PESCO could serve as an inspiration for leveraging the civilian dimension to match the recently advanced military one. More strategic communication of civilian CSDP is an important tool in this direction.**

The current **strategic environment** is marked by complex conflicts in the EU's neighborhood and a fragmenting multilateralist world order, which pose new challenges to the EU. The changes increase the need for the EU member states to deepen cooperation on security and defense, as current challenges cannot be tackled by individual member states. The Compact opens a window of opportunity to strengthen the role and relevance of civilian crisis management in EU security and defense cooperation. The document therefore needs to provide a clear direction for the further development of civilian crisis management and its strategic relevance.

Member states positions diverge on whether a European Security and Defence Union (ESDU) – with no specified end date at this stage – could be appropriate for the **strategic direction**. A question in this context is whether the strategic framework for civilian crisis management is strong enough to make it an integral component of an ESDU or other frameworks for stronger cooperation or integration between member states. Most member states find that the existing strategic framework (the 2016 EU Global Strategy and the May 2018 Concept Paper on civilian CSDP) is sufficient to guide effective future action in civilian crisis management. However, member states attach different levels of relevance to civilian crisis management. Some experts find that neutral actors such as think tanks tend to exaggerate the divergences among the member states' positions. Indeed, there are wide overlaps of interests in security issues, and member states have realized that closer cooperation in this area bears the answer to new security challenges.

In some member states, it is sensitive to frame civilian CSDP as a step towards an ESDU. Elsewhere, by contrast, a civilian component is so self-evident for citizens that they expect it to be a part of military defense strategies. One option would be to match the strengthening of civilian CSDP with PESCO in the military realm. While PESCO cannot serve as blueprint for civilian CSDP due to the diverging status quo of the two strands, the reasoning for the two is very similar and closely connected.

Many **challenges** remain on the way to strengthening civilian crisis management in the EU framework as a complementary aspect to a stronger military component: 1) A central question is how to transform political commitments and ambitions into action on the ground. 2) Member states and EU institutions need to find an agreement on a functioning division of labor between civilian instruments of external action. 3) If the EU wishes to lead civilian CSDP to success, it must convince national governments to release budgets and resources for civilian missions. Line ministries do not currently consider efforts abroad as their utmost priority. 4) Member states need to

Working group on the ESDU

Carina Böttcher delivering inputs in the working group on the ESDU

find effective narratives in the communication with both EU citizens and national stakeholders to convince them that civilian crisis management is necessary and serves the broader vision of a secure and credible EU as a viable actor in international security and defense.

For the **way ahead in 2019 and beyond**, civilian crisis management is relevant and must form an integral component of the EU's future engagement in crises. However, civilian CSDP needs to be embedded in a more coherent vision and the EU should work on drawing attention on previous success stories of civilian missions in third countries. One possibility would be to create public transparency about goals and achievements of missions and inform about concrete numbers of staff and resources on the ground. To support this, the Compact must be a readable, concise point of reference for the EU's future civilian engagement.

2.3. Strengthening the EU as a Civilian Crisis Management Actor – Making Civilian CSDP Fit for Purpose

2.3.1. Background: Making Civilian CSDP Fit for Purpose – Rapid Response, Civilian Capabilities and the Integrated Approach

By Hylke Dijkstra

The implementation of the EU Global Strategy in 2016 has resulted in a fury of activity, including in civilian CSDP. In the last few years, the EU has established a Mission Support Platform with a Core Responsiveness Capacity. It has contracted a new "Warehouse 2.0" and created a new budget line for emergency measures. It is also gradually institutionalizing pre-deployment training through the European Security and Defence College. These are tangible achievements which have an everyday impact on the operations of civilian CSDP.[4]

Once adopted, the new Civilian Compact will present first and foremost a political declaration of the EU and its member states about the direction of civilian CSDP. The Civilian Compact will likely further emphasize the contribution of civilian CSDP to the EU's integrated approach highlighted in the EU Global Strategy. As such, civilian CSDP is part of the internal-external security nexus, which puts the security of EU citizens first.

However, the Civilian Compact should be more than a political declaration aimed solely at road-setting and reaffirming the commitment of the member states. It should also be ambitious in terms of the required capabilities for civilian CSDP. This includes strengthening the ability of the EU to rapidly deploy missions and the acquisition of the relevant civilian capabilities along the internal-external security nexus. On a more general note, the Civilian Compact should be about the ability to sustain civilian missions by reducing vacancy rates.

As the EU Global Strategy notes, "[w]e live in a world of predictable unpredictability."[5] This requires rapid response and the ability to be resilient in the face of the unexpected. The starting point for rapid response is a stronger focus on advance planning and early warning – the long-standing Achilles' heel of CSDP. Indeed, in its first decade, the entire planning machinery only began when the Political and Security Committee deemed that "EU action is appropriate".[6] This was quite extraordinary: It was almost as if NATO would only start planning after Soviet troops entered allied territory. Fortunately, the EU now has an elaborate early warning system run by the EEAS and the member states. Yet, the link with civilian CSDP can be further strengthened; for pro-active contingency planning, for example.

What has recently drawn attention is the proposal by the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, to introduce qualified majority voting (QMV) to civilian CSDP, in addition to sanctions and human rights.[7] The Commission notes that "there are still a number of instances where unanimity has hampered effective decision-making and prevented the EU from acting quickly and robustly."[8] While there are, in fact, no obvious examples in civilian CSDP, QMV could potentially be beneficial in the future – for instance, in the case of potentially increased EU presence in the eastern neighborhood or the Western Balkans where it might face some internal opposition from some member states. QMV would also make civilian CSDP the rule within EU activity rather than the exception.

When it comes to rapid response, however, very significant advances can be made by improving the capabilities of civilian CSDP. The recent Core Responsiveness Capacity is an important achievement. It ensures that pre-identified staff can be quickly deployed during emerging crises. In addition, the Core Responsiveness Capacity strengthens the Brussels mission support structures. That said, it consists of fewer than a dozen experts. To ensure real rapid response, some further imagination is necessary.

First, the EU could transform the Core Responsiveness Capacity into actual standing capacities. It could follow the example of the UN which has police agents and rule of law experts on its payroll. What is meant in this respect are not brigades or divisions, but simply a useful spare capacity that can be deployed at a moment's notice not only for new missions, but also to strengthen existing missions during moments of crisis.

Second, the EU and its member states could start organizing deployments on the basis of teams rather than individual experts. The current human resource management (HRM) plan of filling more than 1,000 vacancies each year is not sustainable. With the present vacancy rate of up to 30 percent in civilian CSDP missions, one cannot help but doubt that the EU is currently capable of launching a new mission matching the original scope of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), which consisted of as many as 2,000 international experts. If member states started working on the basis of teams rather than integrated units, recruitment would be markedly more straightforward.

Third, many member states still fall short where professional domestic HRM policy for civilian CSDP is concerned. Few have up-to-date rosters linked to basic generic training for civilian deployments (CSDP, UN, OSCE),

and career policy for police or judges does not generally include international deployments. Indeed, not much appears to have changed in the decade since the naming-and-shaming analysis of Daniel Korski and Richard Gowan for the European Council on Foreign Relations.[9]

Fourth, the Civilian Compact makes a strong strategic case for the internal-external nexus. Less clear is its impact on civilian capabilities. If the EU wants to include new priorities in civilian CSDP, such as migration, counter-terrorism, border control, or maritime and cyber security,[10] relevant experts should be available for deployment and corresponding expertise be recruited for the EEAS and CSDP directorates. As of yet, much of such expertise does not even exist and would first need to be developed.

In addition to rapid response, some financial aspects remain to be addressed in making civilian CSDP more sustainable. The salary component for seconded national experts merits special attention. If the EU earnestly wants to incentivize member states, and the domestic ministries of interior and justice in particular to participate in civilian CSDP, it cannot rely on charitable contributions that leave member states with domestic vacancies in local police stations and court houses. Some member states have adopted models where, for instance, the ministry of foreign affairs compensates the other ministries for the resulting vacancies. This best practice is not presently shared across the continent.

Rather, the EU should consider providing member states direct compensation from the CFSP budget. This is not as unprecedented as it may seem: Firstly, it is already common practice for the EU to hire – and fully remunerate – experts on a contractual basis if no qualified seconded national experts are available. Secondly, European Commission proposals for a Frontex operational capacity of 10,000 border guards stipulate that these will be paid from the EU budget.[11] Thirdly, the UN already provides a flat-rate compensation to countries contributing to peacekeeping missions.

Part of sustaining civilian capabilities within missions is also to further develop the training model. The standard approach has invariably been for member states to provide staff and thus to be in charge of training such as the basic generic training, pre-deployment training, and hostile environment awareness training. While there is some EU-level effort done on certification, the reality is that 28 member states cannot organize a monthly pre-deployment training tailored for ten different civilian CSDP missions. It would be beneficial to further address training needs through the European Security and Defence College.

Civilian CSDP remains work in progress. The day-to-day operational situation has improved compared to a decade ago, and there is increasing evidence that the EU and its member states are taking pragmatic steps and evading the existential political discussions on CSDP. However, if civilian CSDP is to become a regular EU activity with a dozen ongoing missions and thousands of deployed staff along the entire internal-external security nexus, considerable additional steps remain to be taken with respect to civilian capabilities.

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2.3.2. Current Challenges and Discussions

Key Take-Aways:

- **To make civilian missions fit for purpose, a fully-fledged mission support platform, longer mandates and better planning for the staffing of generic positions in missions present viable options.**
- **Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) would not solve the pressing problems in CSDP.**
- **A more flexible and modular approach needs to be supported by an equally flexible budget allocation on the Commission side.**

There has been improvement in civilian CSDP in the last years with regard to making missions more responsive. For example, a "Warehouse 2.0" for rapid equipment was established, and the EU early warning system was strengthened. However, there are still many aspects that need improvement if civilian CSDP is to take the next step. **Strengthening rapid response** is one example. To this end, the EU should further fortify the link between the early warning system and the civilian CSDP capabilities. Moreover, reaching a decision of 28 member states to demonstrate presence rapidly in crisis situations can at times be time-consuming.

It is crucial for civilian CSDP to keep analyzing the security environment in advance and prepare for possible future missions in hotspots. Many experts favor to have a limited EU contingency planning in the form of **standing capacities** as is the case at the UN, which can be deployed at any moment. While "Warehouse 2.0" is a good start, member states also need to be able to provide personnel rapidly for missions to be successfully launched at short notice.

There is a renewed debate on the utility of **Qualified Majority Voting** (QMV) in civilian CSDP. On the one hand, QMV could accelerate decision-making processes and avoid political blockades. On the other hand, it risks weakening civilian CSDP: This is because one comparative advantage of civilian CSDP is that it enjoys strong political backing by member states, and that its actions represent the interest of a substantial number of member states. Ending the practice of unanimous decision-making could therefore weaken the member states' undivided political support for civilian CSDP and its missions. Moreover, introducing QMV would not solve any of the most pressing issues in civilian CSDP.

There are weaknesses and open questions in the **coordination in civilian CSDP missions**. A frequent case in host countries is that all of the many different actors present wish to coordinate, but none of them are prepared to be coordinated. Currently, the EU is not in a position to assume an overall coordinating role for all international actors on the ground. What is unclear is whether the EU with its civilian CSDP should take a stronger coordinating role specifically in crisis management situations: While by claiming a coordinating role civilian missions could ensure its standards, better internal coordination needs to come first. First and foremost, missions should support UNDP, which usually has the coordinating role in fragile contexts.

In the upcoming EU Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021-2027, member states must find solutions to cure an apparent lack of **financing and resources** in civilian CSDP. One option to make civilian CSDP commitments more attractive for member states is to use a common budget to fully remunerate the staff provided by member states, as well as to reimburse member states for the necessary substitutes in national administrations. Nevertheless, these reimbursement funds would always come from the member states through the EU budget. The problem could also lie in a lack of trust rather than a lack of willingness to contribute to CSDP financially.

Flexible mandates and missions and a **modular approach** are necessary to better respond to the current conflict environment. Stakeholders widely recognize that longer mandates and missions are required to achieve the desired impact and enter a fruitful dialogue with civil society in the host country. An open question in this context is whether mandates must be attached to clear end-states as targets for the missions. Defined end-states bear risks, as one cannot foresee the exact necessary duration of a mission, and missions need to be reactive to the conflict environment. In a dynamic conflict environment, missions need to be able to adjust and adapt to external developments; i.e. to add or remove components. Such a modular approach to missions would **have implications on the CSDP budget**, since the Commission would need to find a way to grant the budget flexibly for the different modules. Effects on the budget would thus be less predic-

Dr Hylke Dijkstra (Maastricht University) providing his input on a civilian CSDP fit for purpose

Magnus Nordström (Swedish MFA) highlighting important aspects

table, but missions and their actions on the ground could become more cost efficient.

A crucial point for concerted EU external action is to incorporate the integrated approach in all efforts to strengthen civilian CSDP in the future. By doing so, member states can ensure communication between all actors and enable a comprehensive view on the EU capabilities, considering all instead of individual instruments.

With regard to the **way ahead in 2019 and beyond**, changes in civilian CSDP will need to be a step by step process. A first step could be to create a mission support platform, and thereafter, to foster a standing capacity of the EU (for generic tasks) and to develop specialized teams. In this respect, all member states must individually carve out the optimal way in which they can make a contribution.

2.4. Revisiting Feira – Implementing the EU Global Strategy in the face of new security challenges

2.4.1. Background: Revisiting Feira – Implementing the EU Global Strategy in the face of new security challenges

By Tobias Pietz

In their "Pathways to Peace" Report, the UN and the World Bank assess that in 2018, the number of violent intra-state conflicts had grown threefold since 2007.12 In the same decade, the EU civilian missions' total staff has been reduced to a third. With the exception of the military Operation Sophia, civilian CSDP thus shares the problem that all missions have faced since the Treaty of Lisbon: decreasing interest and lack of commitment from member states.

Therefore, it is high time to revisit this instrument, modify it for the future, and to generate a new momentum with solid commitments from member states. The EU Global Strategy (EUGS) offers a fitting framework to that end, and sets three strategic priorities for CSDP: to respond to external conflicts and crises, to build the capacities of partners, and to protect the Union and its citizens.

Since the adoption of the EUGS, the launch of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund in 2017 has boosted the military aspect of European security. First mentioned in November 2017,[13] the idea of a Civilian CSDP Compact gained traction throughout 2018 by virtue of the Compact's concept paper, the Civilian Capability Development Plan, and a series of relevant exchanges in European capitals.

In 2016, the European Council had called for the revision of the civilian CSDP priorities to adapt it to the evolving security needs. Also known as the "Feira priorities", these had been defined in the Portuguese city of Santa Maria da Feira in June 2000 in the four following domains of civilian crisis management: police, rule of law, civilian administration, and civil protection. With the exception of civil protection, all points have been effectively translated into a range of civilian missions. Monitoring capacities, support to EU Special Representatives, Security Sector Reform (SSR), and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) have since been included as additional priority areas.

Following various discussions in late 2017 and early 2018, the European Council presented an internal concept paper entitled "Strengthening Civilian CSDP" in April 2018 which identified possible new lines of operation for CSDP. According to the concept paper, these new tasks were security challenges "linked to irregular migration, hybrid threats, cyber security, terrorism and radicalization, organized crime, border management and maritime security, as well as preventing and countering violent extremism".[14] The European Council Conclusions in the following month endorsed these new lines of operation, while also emphasizing that the Feira priorities remained the "core function of civilian CSDP".[15]

This raises some crucial questions: If the four priorities defined in Feira remain the core function of civilian CSDP, what should be the role of the new lines of operation? Will there be dedicated CSDP missions mandated with specific priority areas such as migration management or cyber security? Or will these tasks be included as mere supplements in broader missions? These points remain unclear and subject to varying interpretation depending on the member state.

It seems that the sorely needed revision or adjustment of CSDP tasks through the concept paper did not emanate from a clear assessment by stakeholders, but was rather a reaction to the most pressing domestic issues for member states. All new lines of operation have a clear link to internal security and thus foremost to the first of the five strategic priorities of the Global Strategy: to protect the Union and its citizen.

Naturally, CSDP – a highly political tool in itself – needs to keep various demands and interests of different actors in balance in order to be efficient and effective. Furthermore, member states' political engagement for and, consequently, commitment to CSDP missions are achievable only if governments recognize their utility, including their value for domestic ends. With their clear link to internal security, then, these new lines of operation could have a valuable potential to generate political will for CSDP missions among hitherto reluctant governments.

Despite this opportunity, however, managing the expectations on what CSDP can realistically deliver in these areas will be key. As the European Council Conclusions and various other documents state, CSDP is but one actor in security and, with the growing tendency to take a backseat to EU actors such as Frontex or Europol, it does not hold a comparative advantage in any of the new lines of operation. Performing well in contentious and complex issues such as irregular migration, cyber security or counter-terrorism under the wary eyes of member states will be no bed of roses, and if gone wrong, could jeopardize other existing or future CSDP missions.

Moreover, the new lines of operation are not on par with the demands and priorities of local partners in post-

conflict situations. Recent papers by the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) and the Clingendael Institute even suggest that some operations – such as those aimed at supporting border and migration management – can have harmful and destabilizing effects in the host country.[16] This risks undermining CSDP's legitimacy and credibility among local partners, which are essential for stabilization, peacebuilding and external crisis management.[17]

To date, a clear common understanding of CSDP's future tasks appears to be lacking. For that reason, the Compact should – especially in its envisaged implementation phase in the next years – entail a knowledge-based and transparent process for a revision of the Feira priorities through:

- an assessment of external needs and demands for CSDP missions (local partners as well as UN, OSCE and African Union (AU) peace operations)
- a review of successful cases in the implementation of the Feira priorities in CSDP missions
- an assessment if the currently available resources, personnel and expertise are still sufficient to implement the old priorities
- a mapping exercise to identify which EU actors or instruments have comparative advantages in which fields
- a feasibility study on how to improve or maintain resources/personnel/expertise in old and new lines of operation
- a decision on which tasks to forgo, to add, or to strengthen

Needless to say, a mere discussion on what tasks future missions should perform will hardly suffice to meet the level of ambition for CSDP as foreseen by the EUGS and the respective Council Conclusions in 2017 and 2018. However, without a clear vision of what truly works for stabilization, crisis management or peacebuilding, CSDP is doomed to failure.

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2.4.2. Current Challenges and Discussions

Key Take-Aways:

- **The Feira priorities can be seen as broader tools to address new security challenges.**
- **More evaluation on prior missions and a "revisiting of Feira" is needed to determine what has worked in the past. An objective evaluation is needed.**
- **A self-centered narrative of civilian CSDP could have adverse effects; adapting the priorities bears manifold operational challenges.**

When the EEAS circulated a new concept for civilian CSDP in May 2018, it sparked a lasting debate among member states and other actors about the role of the **Feira priorities in light of new security challenges**[18] including irregular migration, hybrid threats and organized crime. In the past, some actors had feared that the new security challenges would override the Feira priorities in future missions. By contrast, a consensus appears to have evolved that the new security challenges could be subsumed under Feira. According to this approach, the Feira priorities are seen as a set of broader tools to tackle new challenges.

It is crucial to frame the new challenges appropriately in order to keep civilian CSDP supportable for all, both in terms of its focus and to avoid setting unrealistic expectations. A **self-centered civilian CSDP** which shifts away from a partnerships-promoting approach is risky and could have lasting negative effects: If CSDP actors focus exclusively on EU interest and neglect host countries' needs and challenges, they could destabilize operating areas and create tensions with host countries in the long term. **Capacity building** in the shape of building institutions, for instance, is currently considered a core strength of civilian CSDP missions. This makes CSDP not a mere symbolic tool (in the words of a discussant: "just raising the flag"), but a strategic instrument.

The consensus both on the unchanged relevance of the Feira priorities and the future tasks for the new security challenges leads to several suggestions: 1) **More evaluation on prior missions and a "revisiting of Feira"** to determine what has worked so far. 2) The Compact needs to leave **flexibility in civilian CSDP priorities** so they can be changed in response to new, unforeseen challenges. 3) The **analysis of the crisis situation on the ground prior to deployment** is important and should be strengthened. This analysis should involve line ministries which are responsible for bilateral interaction with host countries to avoid duplication. Moreover, involving military analysis could potentially improve shared analysis and allow for useful synergies. Civilian mission planning tends to neglect the link to military operations, and personnel on either side are not trained to work with one another.

Tobias Pietz (ZIF) starting the discussion on the Feira priorities

Regular analysis missions to mission operating areas present a further significant potential which has thus far not been sufficiently used: These could consist of EU member states and independent experts, including in cooperation with the UN. As EU missions can become a party to a conflict, analysts should investigate power structures in advance. This analysis should feed into the planning of the mission to prevent manipulation by conflict parties and, more generally, to become part of the conflict dynamic. The mission is only justified if it takes more from the conflict than it adds to it.

The German Federal Government's proposed commitment in the shape of a new **Center of Excellence in Berlin** could act as an independent platform, as well as a means to include more expert analysis in civilian CSDP.

3. The Way Forward – How to Strengthen Civilian CSDP

3.1. Clearing the Commitments: Member States' Inputs to the Compact

Key Take-Aways:

- **Commitments should be made and followed up collectively. Member states should focus on comparative advantages, and not feel pressured to contribute in every aspect.**
- **Improvements in recruitment, training and national structures are key challenges to further professionalize civilian CSDP.**
- **National implementation plans are important not only as reference documents at national level, but also to track the implementation of commitments from the Compact.**

Adopted in November 2018, the civilian CSDP Compact contains commitments made by member states and EU institutions in order to strengthen the civilian CSDP for future challenges. These commitments will set the stage for the Compact's implementation in 2019 and beyond – and as such, carry central importance for a sustainable and ambitious progress of the instruments. Conference participants discussed necessary commitments ahead of the EU's agreement on the Compact.

Most member states agree that **commitments should be made and followed up collectively**. Member states should focus on comparative advantages, and not feel pressured to contribute in every aspect.

For the future of civilian CSDP, it will be essential to have the necessary capabilities. A key to making civilian CSDP fit for the current security challenges thus lies in how to **build and sustain these capabilities**. To avoid duplication and make capability development for CSDP cost effective, it should not run separately from capability development for national purposes: The goal should be to make the necessary qualifications for CSDP an inherent part of national capability development, e.g. in the police force. Whether the capabilities should be determined by numbers or goals remains open. Common benchmarks could serve as an option in this regard. Furthermore, a large share of required capabilities is generic for each mission (e.g. IT and logistics, between 60-80 percent). Those capabilities can be developed without anticipating the needed quantities, as they are in high demand in peace operations of other organizations or in national administrations as well. For capabilities in the areas of hybrid threats and cyber, one idea could be that the two Centers of Excellence provide capabilities in the form of short-term assessment teams.

Training is a key issue to develop necessary capabilities and thereby professionalize civilian CSDP. More standardization and harmonization are needed; experienced member states should therefore share best practices. Pre-deployment training with the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) can only complement preceding basic training by member states. Thus, it is essential that national trainings are harmonized and guarantee certain standards. An EU civilian training group consisting of member state institutions could provide strategic guidance. One idea is that mission leadership undertake pre-deployment training together to foster a shared understanding before going into mission. A further option is an EU-integrated training cell in the EEAS (as is the case in the UN), which could hone responsibility and ownership for training.

The Compact needs to address the **demand for flexibility and modularity** for each mission whilst avoiding to be vague. One option to make missions more flexible and to allow them to focus on core tasks is to establish a fully-fledged mission support platform in Brussels. Deploying pilots on new capabilities in suitable missions for a limited period of time is a promising stride toward making civilian CSDP more flexible and modular, as is the development and deployment of specialized teams. More staff should receive core training in advance and be prepared for flexible and quick deployment, so that in case of a dispatch, they merely require a swift pre-deployment training.

If there is a means to extend **recruitment** beyond civil servants in more member states, it would give secondment considerable potential. To encourage more member states to make advancements in this regard, it is important to enhance the exchange of knowledge and best practices. More secondment would help member states retain their ownership in CSDP. Capitalizing on the momentum of the Compact process at national level, several member states are now willing to strengthen national structures for recruitment. Nevertheless, besides structural improvements, member states must strengthen and align the incentives for seconded personnel to create long-term sustainability – so far, contracts are often more

beneficial for staff in terms of salary or social security. A centralized human resources management (HRM) in CPCC could also help make civilian CSDP more attractive for secondees. Apart from applying a more professionalized approach than single missions, a centralized HRM would make it easier to offer career options to secondees by switching missions.

Experts are divided over the necessity and usefulness of **quantitative targets** in civilian CSDP. On the one hand, it would be reasonable to build on the existing capacities for rapid mission equipment through the strategic Warehouse (200 persons within 30 days) with a corresponding quantitative target of 200 civilian experts to be deployed within 30 days. On the other hand, numerical targets do not automatically guarantee a sustainable and ongoing capability development process at national level.

Irene-Maria Eich (ESDC) highlighting additional aspects in the commitments working group

What experts do widely agree upon is that **national implementation plans** can serve as effective national reference documents which can integrate the Compact and articulate it further. By means of the plans, member states could also track the implementation of commitments. To ensure their best use, member states need to establish regular communication channels on national plans and contributions.

An adequate **timeline to fulfill commitments** is also important: The time frame should allow for the momentum of the current political processes to endure, but should refrain from being overly ambitious lest the undertaking lose credibility. While many actors deem a time frame of three to four years as expedient, others advocate for a longer horizon.

Third state contributions to missions should be encouraged to fill capability gaps. However, this requires an updated framework for these contributions.

In future discussions about potential mission areas, the services should provide **informed estimates on costs** of different options to member states prior to decisions about missions. In this context, member states should also make **better use of Political Frameworks for Conflict Analysis (PFCAs)** prior to mission deployments.

3.2. Sustaining the Compact: How to Establish a Reliable Review Process

Key Take-Aways:

- **The Compact should include review processes. Two sets are plausible to accompany the current strengthening process of civilian CSDP: Review processes (1) of member states' commitments in the Compact, and (2) of capabilities.**
- **A review on commitments could help member states track their implementations and demonstrate credibility to partners.**
- **Most participants were in favor of a peer review. Other suggestions included reviews through the Foreign Affairs Council or a specialized secretariat in the EEAS.**

The Compact should include review processes to accompany the ongoing efforts to improve civilian CSDP.

The Compact should substantiate a r**eview process to track the commitments** made in the Compact. This review of commitments should be linked to national budget discussions. Experts widely agree on the need for concrete national implementation plans. These plans could serve as a basis to evaluate whether or not member states are meeting their targets and honoring their commitments.

In the implementation phase of the Compact commitments, there should be a fixed **timeline for review processes**. Regular reviews are necessary to ensure that member states act within the agreed period. Many support a review period of one year, as this would keep the political attention high and would correspond to the annual budget cycles. Moreover, the future review of commitments should not only be backward but also forward-looking. The use of best practice examples from other international organizations (such as the UN or NATO) was encouraged. Review processes should be standardized and, at the same time, be adaptable to future challenges.

There are many reasons to support of a well-designed commitments review process: It allows member states to demonstrate their political will to strengthen civilian CSDP and to foster credibility of the instrument, both domestically and toward contributing third states and host governments. Reviews can also ensure that budget and resource needs of civilian CSDP are met and, if well designed, support the transfer of knowledge among member states. Lastly, reviews of commitments could also promote strategic communication of civilian CSDP to both citizens and governments: For EU citizens, review processes demonstrate transparency and illustrate the relevance and added value of civilian CSDP. For national governments, review processes display how their funds are being used.

An important question is **which actors should oversee the review processes**. Many member states favor **peer review processes**. Some also find it necessary to increase pressure to guarantee that commitments are indeed met. At the same time, most insisted the reviews must not result in public "naming and shaming" for those member states who fall behind their commitments. At the same time, it would be a positive signal to reward highly engaged member states. On the positive side, self-evaluation of member states might fuel domestic debates within the countries and increase the involvement of line ministries. A scheduled public comparison might also motivate member states to work on commitments continuously.

Working group on Review Processes

Another possibility would be to refer the review process of the Compact commitments to the care of the Foreign Affairs Council; an option which offers clear advantages and disadvantages: While the Council could involve the highest possible level, this option risks a further politicization of the review processes, and subsequently, a lack of neutrality. Neutral institutions such as a special secretariat within the EEAS or think tanks could potentially offer an alternative to the Foreign Affairs Council. Currently, CPCC has the best overview but does not have the sufficient personnel to conduct reviews.

Whether **sanctions** could help the process is a contentious issue: On the one hand, there must be a level of consistency if a country does not fulfil its target. On the other hand, sanctions are undesirable and, importantly, a legal basis for such a mechanism is currently non-existent.

The necessity of **regular reviews of capabilities in missions** to sustainably track the Capability Development Plan is another separate issue. Such reviews could clarify urgent questions such as those on which capabilities are sufficient and insufficient in current missions, and where the gaps are. Crucially, capability reviews offer a feedback loop from national staff back to the EEAS, which is a prerequisite for lessons learned to feed into future missions. One step to strengthen this approach would be to re-establish the position on lessons learned at CMPD. Furthermore, the review processes could also improve communication from the opposite direction: from the EEAS to member states. This way, the EEAS could notify how many staff and resources it needs from member states in the future, which would allow the latter to plan ahead.

3.3. Mission Mandates and More: Implementing the Concept

Key Take-Aways:

- **The implementation of more flexible and rapid approaches is already underway. Now, new mandates need to support this development.**
- **Longer mandates should be a further step toward implementing the new concept for their capacity to e.g. foster relations of the mission in the host state.**
- **More first-hand experience in the EEAS (e.g. police or justice expertise) and several "generations" of deployed staff in missions should be promoted to help the interpretation of mandates.**

The new concept for the future civilian CSDP from May 2018 aims to make the instrument more flexible, scalable, capable, and modular. The last rapid mission set-up of EUAM Iraq in autumn 2017 signaled that in practice, the implementation of this new concept is already underway. Given the current window of opportunity, this needs to

Philipp Rotmann (GPPi) moderating the working group

be taken further and be formalized in a new generation of mission mandates to perpetuate this progress.

Faster **decision-making** is one important step. Decision-making in some first exemplary missions was quite swift in recent years. What is necessary is a careful analysis of the challenges and priorities prior to each mission, rather than micromanagement in active missions. Although decision-making among 28 member states may at times delay the process, the Foreign Affairs Council's endorsement for civilian CSDP missions remains an important political signal.

An open question is which problems to tackle first in light of diverging strategic and political agendas. Package deals which would, for instance, allow the exchange of mission modules with one another offer one way to address this problem.

Flexible mission mandates should allow for more flexibility and modularity of missions. There is a broad understanding that civilian missions need longer mandates, given that building trust and continuity with host governments is crucial for their success. Additionally, as longer mandates offer more security for seconded personnel, they could pave the way for better staffing. What remains open is whether the intervals between mission reviews should be reduced or enlarged. Short gaps would ensure tailor-made, well-adapted approaches to different conflicts, while longer intervals would minimize the manpower and resources spent on the reviews.

First-hand experience in the EEAS (e.g. as police or justice expertise) and advice by several "generations" of deployed staff in missions could feed into the formulation of mandates. There is currently no agreement on how precise or broad mission mandates and evaluations should be. Ideas also diverge on how to measure a successful mission. In particular, there is no agreement on whether "handing over the keys" to the local governments once the security situation has improved is sufficient, or whether more sustainable results and a proven transfer of knowledge is necessary to mark a success. Experts are currently discussing different options on the depth and methods of evaluation, including consultations with mission leadership or independent holistic assessments.

In terms of planning, strategic mission planning is of crucial importance to make civilian CSDP fit for purpose. Member states must discuss possible options to make the EEAS's mission planning more flexible, while retaining ownership of CSDP.

Executive missions in particular should be conducted only if a clear end is stated, and if equipped with adequate resources. Experience has shown that it remains difficult to reconcile political sensitivities with the successful delivery of executive tasks in practice.

4. Communicating Civilian CSDP

4.1. Strategic Communication – How to sell the Compact?

Key Take-Aways:

- **There is an apparent lack in communicating the need for and the added value of civilian CSDP to different target audiences such as line ministries.**
- **Different target audiences need to be addressed in different tailor-made ways.**
- **Better and more communication can improve the visibility of civilian CSDP. It could also help mitigate common problems such as perceived competition with internal security actors for qualified staff and resources.**

Civilian CSDP receives little attention at national level, which is concerning. For example, as national politicians and ministries are more concerned about security challenges in internal rather than external security, it is difficult to staff civilian missions abroad with adequate numbers of police, judges and prosecutors. Civilian CSDP has even less visibility among the broader public.

If communicated better, civilian CSDP could be presented as part of a European response to perceived and actual insecurity and instability in the Union. These are only two of manifold reasons why strategic communication could benefit the overall goals of civilian CSDP. Its significance, added value and successes need to be strategically communicated to relevant audiences: **the line ministries, national politicians, host countries of missions, the potential secondees, and the broader public**. This leads to the question as to how stakeholders can "sell" the civilian CSDP to these actors.

The first step is to develop more systematic approaches to communication. First, it is necessary to explore why it is difficult to reach certain target groups and effectively convey the messages. Findings show that there are numerous potential incentives to strengthen civilian CSDP's profile among the target groups. Additionally, actors should make targeted use of the opportunities accompanying the 2018 Compact. Some suggestions to this end are elaborated below.

4.2. Findings: Strategic Communication of Civilian CSDP

Currently, stakeholders are not communicating civilian CSDP to the full extent to important target audiences: the national line ministries, national politicians, host countries of missions, the potential secondees, and the broader public. Through a brainstorming session the following results were obtained (see follwing tables).

Andréas Hatzidiakos (French MFA) presenting the group findings


Working group discussing potentials in strategic communication

National Politicians	
Current perception	▪ National politicians consider it relevant and recognize the added value, because security starts at the root causes
Incentives	▪ Votes: Electorates perceive civilian engagement as better than military (differs among member states) ▪ Explain internal-external link ▪ Cost-effective if compared to military expenses, and for potentially preventing a costly conflict
Communication	▪ Narrative One: Civilian CSDP as hard security matter. Commitments need to be leveled up with military (balance); – open ears. ▪ Narrative Two: Complement rather than compete with military ▪ For both narratives: Use experts as communicators, focus on added value, use pictures & easy language
Role of the Compact	▪ The focus should not be on the Compact as a document, but the tasks and impacts ensuing from it; ▪ Translate Compact into accessible language, and demonstrate links to existing aspects as well as the gaps it seeks to fill ▪ Explain need for civilian CSDP ▪ Show cooperation and seek synergies

Line Ministries	
Current perception	Different perceptions: ▪ Civilian CSDP is a competitor for resources ▪ Civilian CSDP is insignificant, based on lack of understanding of its contribution to international security > Focus on internal issues ▪ Practically non-existent in some countries
Incentives	▪ Civilian CSDP supports line ministries' tasks > burden-sharing ▪ Present facts and figures as tangible results of missions ▪ Ownership and inclusion ▪ Financial compensation ▪ Personnel comes back with new experience and competences ▪ Training and experience from seconded experts valuable for line ministries ▪ Additional visibility for line ministries in public and EU institutions
Communication	▪ Joint Council meetings (and PSC - COSI) ▪ Inter-ministerial meetings (institutionalized) between MFA, MoD, MoI, Ministry of Development, Chancellery ▪ Internal-external security nexus ▪ Organize home coming day for personnel as welcome-back and information-sharing event
Role of the Compact	▪ Factsheet on Compact ▪ Joint planning ▪ Annual review ▪ Inclusion of line ministries, e.g. through inter-ministerial meetings ▪ Annual report to parliament

Potential Secondees	
Current perception	▪ Either none, or: ▪ Poor remuneration, burdensome for oneself as well as family, dangerous
Incentives	▪ Decent salary on a regular basis ▪ Prestige and appreciation ▪ Develop career paths if possible or applicable, e.g. police force
Communication	▪ Explain what civilian CSDP is, what the individuals can contribute, and which skills could be useful for missions ▪ Use experienced personnel as spokespersons ▪ Use videos as a medium
Role of the Compact	▪ None, or: ▪ Harmonization of standards, contracts, or financial conditions

Host countries	
Current perception	▪ High turnover of EU interlocutors in the missions ▪ Too many interlocuters, no “common voice” ▪ Short and unclear mandates > Expectations vague
Incentives	▪ Concrete small projects > generate attention with tangible results (within the overall area of the mandate)
Communication	▪ Social networks ▪ Dedicated campaign ▪ Dedicated communication officers: One within the mission, one in the EEAS in Brussels
Role of the Compact	▪ Involve local authorities in the planning phase

Broader public	
Current perception	▪ None, or other wording: The instrument civilian CSDP is not seen, but rather its impact.
Incentives	▪ For countries with a stronger civilian lens in EU for crisis management: Emphasize values and peaceful nature ▪ For countries with a stronger military tradition: Explain complementary rather than competing approach to crisis management
Communication	▪ Media interviews, especially to present local angles and local validating voices; ▪ Video profiles ▪ Training classes in public schools, led by diplomats and experts ▪ Update websites for missions in all EU languages: Liaise with the EU Directorate-General Communication ▪ More ministerial visits to missions ▪ Member state governments must assume the task of communicating ▪ Internal-external threat nexus: “L’Europe qui protège”
Role of the Compact	▪ Use momentum to clear commitments ▪ Make the Compact concise, readable and public ▪ Public information as a commitment, motto: Accountability through transparency

Notes

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